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[SYMPOSIUM]

STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC
LAND POLICY*
GEORGE R. HALLt

The Public Land Law Review Commission could rank with the
Homestead Act, the establishment of the National Forests, the
Inland Waterways Commission, the White House Conference of
1908, and other major landmarks in land policy history. Hopefully,
one of the Commission's contributions will be to stimulate a reappraisal of public policy toward natural resources and to encourage
a review of the objectives and potentials of public land management.
In such a reappraisal and review, major attention should be given to
the interaction between policies and the administrative organization
responsible for effectuating the policies. This Article will consider
some aspects of this interaction.
The theme of the analysis is that, although many improvements
can be instituted within the present organizational framework of
the federal government, the basic need for more integration and
coordination of natural resource management and development
decisions can only be achieved through substantial changes in the
organization of the Government's administration. Put another way,
significant managerial and policy improvements imply a significant
reorganization of federal departments and agencies.
In recent years the literature on natural resources has increased
both in amount and sophistication. Yet, there has been a tendency
to analyze separately the economic and political components of
natural resource programs. The substantive issue of how natural
resources should be managed and developed, however, is intimately
intertwined with the procedural issue of how the federal government's resource activities should be organized. Thus, a key element
in obtaining a more effective public land policy is a better understanding of the relationship between policy objectives and policy administration.
The following section considers four interrelated physical, economic, and institutional constraints on public land management.
* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be
interpreted as reflecting the views of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or
policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. The suggestions of
J. R. Schlesiger and I. N. Fisher of the RAND Corporation are appreciated.
t The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
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Section II considers strategic objectives of land management, and
section III draws organizational implications from the' analysis of
the objectives and constraints.
SOME PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

Four factors that help make public land management such a complex task will be discussed in this section. These factors are: externalities, exclusionary uses, heterogeneity of public land holdings,
and division of governmental responsibility.
.4.

Externalities
One of the conditions necessary to assure that the market system
will achieve an efficient allocation of resources is that the full costs
and benefits resulting from any decision fall on the unit making
that decision. If some costs can be shifted to other decision-units,
private costs do not reflect the full cost to society of the decision and
resource allocation may be distorted. This effect is called an external
diseconomy or, more commonly, a spill-over and is one of the major
problems facing natural resource management. Thus, the decision
of a factory to dump its wastes into a river may raise the costs of
firms downstream by forcing them to purify water used in manufacturing; it may also lower the production of commercial and sport
fishing and destroy the recreational value of the stream.
Spill-overs, and the related subjects of decreasing marginal costs
of production and the existence of public goods, are frequently
lumped together and given the title of "market-failure." In unregulated markets, market-failure results in outputs and prices that are
not economically optimal. Cases of market-failure seem especially
common in the natural resources area. Forest fire and disease control
by one forest owner affects other owners; well-drilling practices can
affect the production of large numbers of firms; operations of upstream dams affect downstream dams; many other examples will
come immediately to mind. The interesting question is why marketfailure seems more prevalant here than in manufacturing.
The explanation is that in the industrial sector, markets and firms
tend to adjust in size in order to internalize spill-overs. The organizational structure changes to give managers control over interrelated decisions. In the natural resources area, property rights
problems and the magnitude of the investment that would be required to internalize spill-overs hamper this remedy. Consequently,
externalities are more visible in the natural resources sector.
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Market-failure has occupied much of the attention of economists
concerned with natural resources policy.' Without questioning the
need for governmental intervention in such situations, it is important
to keep in mind that public ownership and control itself may result
in something akin to market-failure. That is, the governmental organization may be such that agencies will lack the incentive or
authority to take spill-overs into account.
The problem of obtaining economic efficiency through public administration, however, goes beyond the question of insuring that
spill-overs will be taken into account by decision-makers, although
this is a serious enough problem in itself. Public management is
not merely private management without the profit motive; governmental management must abide by relevant "rules-of-the-game."
These rules often may lead to results different from those dictated
by economic logic. This often leads economists to regard politicians
as parochial, and politicians to regard economists as naive. The
problem, however, is not one of outlook, but of failure to integrate
organizational and policy analysis.
One rule-of-the-game is that agencies require political support
from private groups, industries, professions, and other nongovernmental organizations. For this reason, a bureau may be loath to
make otherwise desirable decisions that would damage the interests
of its "constituency." This is not due solely to "capture" of governmental organizations by private interests. The bureau may regard
service to its private supporters as necessary to achieve strength to
carry out long-run objectives.
A close link between agencies and private groups is especially
characteristic of the natural resource sector. The research agencies
have close links with the scientific professions. The Bureau of
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers have close links with local
development groups. The Park Service has close links with naturalist groups. The Bureau of Fisheries has close links with the commercial fishing industry and sports-fishing clubs. This list could be
extended to include all agencies. These alliances, like most alliances,
are complex mixtures of mutual benefit and conflict. The point, however, is that a government agency is much more than an electronic
computer evaluating economic benefits and costs. When the noneconomic considerations inherent in the existence of a public agency
1. An excellent treatment of externalities is contained in Krutilla & Eckstein,
Multiple Purpose River Development (1958) ; for a helpful survey with an extensive
bibliography, see Prest & Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 Economic J.
683 (1965).
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are included, there is no automatic assurance that market-failure will
be corrected.
Other rules-of-the-game relevant for political decision-making
could be discussed but a single illustration will suffice. A wide geographical distribution of governmental expenditures is considered a
desirable feature of public programs. Sometimes this is written into
law, like the former Area Redevelopment Administration. Other
times, it is merely regarded by public officials as "sound policy."
Wide geographical distribution may make "political sense" but it
can constrain the economic results of programs if cost-benefit considerations imply geographical concentration of expenditures.
On a more theoretical level, it is still a moot question whether
public decisions should be made in the same manner as private decisions would be made in markets with no spill-overs or other
imperfections. Most discussions of this issue have focused on the
appropriate social rate of interest and the issue of "second-best"
solutions, or decisions when not all conditions of optimum are met.
Let us note the importance of the problems of interest rates and
second-best solutions and limit our attention to a less discussed
problem, uncertainty. Should there be differences in public and
private attitudes towards risk and uncertainty?
Most individuals discount future costs and benefits due to their
uncertainty. Should the Government also be risk adverse? Unlike a
private investor, losses from incorrect investment will not lead the
Government to bankruptcy. Also, more pooling of risks by the Government may be possible. Against this can be posed the argument
that future discounts should reflect the inherent technological and
demand risks and uncertainties so they should not depend upon
whether the investment is privately or publicly owned. Like the
problem of the appropriate social interest rate, the argument about
the appropriate treatment of uncertainty by public authorities illustrates the difficulty that still exists in formulating explicit, normative
decision rules for public authorities. The result is that governmental
organizations have and must have wide latitude in formulating managerial policies.
There is another aspect of uncertainty that has received less
attention than merited even though it is of prime importance for
land policy. This is the uncertainty associated with decisions to develop presently undeveloped areas. Ordinarily one thinks of a consumer's satisfaction as being determined by the goods and services
he uses. However, the opportunity to use some facility in the future
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may also yield consumer satisfaction. 2 To illustrate, a consumer
may not presently be using the national parks. However, the option
to use these facilities or the availability of the facilities may directly
increase his satisfaction. The consumer might purchase an option to
use the national parks even if he had no immediate plan to visit a
park and even if he were unsure that he would ever want to use
park facilities. Holding the option would increase his range of
potential choices and keep the opportunity of a park visit open to
him. This possibility might be an economic good in the sense that
utility may be higher with it than without it.
One may go a step further and consider intergenerational aspects.
The present consumer might not be interested in using parks but he
might wish to provide his children with an option to use the facilities. That is, he might receive satisfaction from knowing that he
had provided his descendents (or future generations in general)
with the opportunity to consume national park services should they
wish."
With sufficient current use by other consumers to support the
facility, the opportunity for future use is provided automatically.
Thus, future availability is important only when present use is not
sufficient to maintain the facilities but the supplementary value of
the options is sufficiently large to justify maintaining the availability
4
of the facility.
In this latter situation, private decision-making will lead to
market failure because the rational behavior for an), consumer is
to stand back and let someone else maintain the area for him. It
is in each individual's interest to argue that an option has no value to
him in the hope that others who value the option will bear the cost
2. See Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfection, and
the Limits of Economics, 19 Kyklos 23 (1966), and references cited therein.
3. Formally this can be expressed in either of two ways: letting U stand for consumer utility and X, . . . Xn for the goods in the consumption set, we can write:

(1)

U= U (X,.. ., Xn)

Ordinarily X, .
Xn are considered to be goods and services presently consumed. This present argument suggests that in equation X 1 . . . X2 should be
considered to be the discounted, expected future consumption, either of the
individual or the individual and any future consumers that affect his decision making.
Alternatively, we can write:
(2) U* = U* (X.... Xn, Xn + 1 ... Xn + m) where Xn + 1... Xn + m
stand for options or rights to use items for consumption purposes in the
future.
4. This argument is somewhat similar to an "infant industry" theory of tariffs,
or the argument sometimes used by members of the development school to justify
government investment in natural resource development. This latter theory will be
mentioned in the following section.
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of keeping the area available. If, of course, actual use were limited
to those who had paid to maintain availability, this strategy would
not work.' If, however, a facility is open to users regardless of their
past payments, then market-failure is likely. The facility may not be
maintained even though the combined value of its use and availability exceeds the cost.
Public ownership can resolve this problem since taxes can be
levied to pay for availability. The problem is, of course, estimating
the benefits of availability. Benefits from current use are hard
enough to measure; benefits of options for future use are more
difficult by several orders of magnitude.
Uncertainty is important here because the irreversability of development decisions requires very long-range forecasting and places
a special penalty on incorrect decisions. The problem is most severe
for wilderness or other areas where the value of the service rendered
by the land is a function of geological, ecological, historical, or
similar features. A decision to develop-that is, to change the
area-cannot be reversed, at least not to the degree that the
decision to change the use of a developed area can be reversed.
For a developed area, a decision about the use of the area that
turns out to have been incorrect can be reversed at some cost. That
is, if a decision to devote a national forest area to timber production
for pulp-wood rather than campsites turns out to be incorrect due
to a faulty forecast of future demands for pulp and camping, the
area can at a future date be redeveloped for campsites. Redevelopment may have costs that could have been avoided had the future
been estimated correctly, but mistakes are correctable at some
expense.
A wilderness area, however, cannot be "undeveloped." This
means that future demands for the use of such areas must be forecast with greater accuracy. One major difficulty is that users of
wilderness areas differ widely in their views about the distinguishing
characteristics of wilderness areas, and relevant tastes have changed
markedly over time. 6
5. An analogy might be made to private country clubs where use is contingent on
the member paying an initiation fee or capital charge to support the availability of
the facility.
This problem is also analogous to financing national defense. In both cases, provision for one person results in a low or zero marginal cost of provision for other
people. Thus, both cases are appropriately regarded as public goods.
6. Lucas, User Concepts of Wilderness and Their Implications for Resource
Management, in New Horizons for Resources Research: Issues and Methodology 29-39

(1964 Western Resources Papers, 1965) ; Lucas, Wilderness Perception and Use: The
Example of Boundary Canoe Area, 3 Natural Resources J. 394 (1964).
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On the other hand, the irreversability of decisions to develop
areas suitable for wilderness recreation and the relative scarcity of
such areas argues for great care in making decisions about initial
development. It seems proper to give considerable weight to potential future, though uncertain, demands for wilderness use. Of course,
the nature of the uncertainty here is such that it should be borne
collectively through Government ownership.
Exclusionary Uses
Development and similar land use decisions introduce the second
complicating factor, exclusionary uses. Indeed, the problems of development decisions for wilderness areas and exclusionary land uses
are really two aspects of a single phenomenon, the impact of output
quality decisions on the quality or characteristics of the outputs.
Within broad ranges, many uses of land can be combined on a
single area. Multiple use land management, now widely accepted as
a desirable policy, implies such a combination.7 Uses may be combined simultaneously-timber growing and hunting, for exampleor sequentially-grazing and timber growing-at different times.
Such uses may be competitive in that increasing the output of one
product requires a decrease in the output of another product, factor
inputs constant. Since uses can be combined in some proportions, the
problem is to choose the appropriate balance among outputs.
Modern managerial techniques, such as operations analysis, benefitcost models, and similar tools, plus increased scientific research on
this problem, have greatly increased managerial abilities to make
such decisions.
Output decisions are much more complex when the combination of
uses affects not only the quantity of outputs but their characteristics
or qualities. Camping in a dense forest is a qualitatively different
experience from camping in a heavily logged area. Wilderness recreation is, of course, the extreme case.
With compatible uses, decisions about marginal adjustments of
inputs and outputs are required. With non-compatible uses, such as
lumbering and wilderness recreation, the decision is an all-or-nothing
one. Here the difference between rules-of-the-game for markets and
for governmental administration are important. Markets work well
to indicate appropriate marginal adjustments. With exclusionary
products, particularly, the value of availability is important, or there
B.

7. Hall, The Myth and Reality of Multiple Use Forestry, 3 Natural Resources J.
276 (1963); Hall, Product Quality and Public Land Management, 40 Land Econ. 59
(1964).
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are significant spill-overs, and market failure is likely. On the other
hand, the political process is one of compromise; public officials like
to please as many groups as possible. Consequently, even if the
Government has the power to exclude some uses, this power may
not be exerted. A decision to exclude all but wilderness-lovers from
a large area, or conversely, to destroy the value of the area for
wilderness-lovers, is not an easy decision for either markets or
governmental administrators. Formal managerial models are of
little help to a public official faced by this problem. More important,
he is sure to make one or more groups angry-not a happy situation
for anyone in public life.
In short, output decisions involving exclusionary demands are
always sources of conflict. Yet they are among the most vital of
land management decisions. Results of incorrect decisions can be
tragic. A number of the national parks have ceased to be places
where significant or unique scenic and ecological formations are
maintained. Instead, many have become simply locations for tennis
courts, swimming pools, ski lifts, and resorts. It is important to
insure that qualitative changes in land uses are not made haphazardly.
In all fairness it should be emphasized that user views about the
distinguishing characteristics of "wilderness" or "undeveloped"
areas change over time, and at present vary widely. Also, maintenance of an area in its "natural state" is difficult and contains elements of inconsistency. High-intensity of use is not consistent with
preservation of natural characteristics. Yet it is precisely the areas
with a likelihood of extensive use where there will be a demand for
preservation. The more the use, the more effort will have to be
expended on fire and pollution control and similar requirements.
Soon it is not clear that the area is "undeveloped."
C.

Heterogeneity of Public Land Holdings
Public land management is still further complicated by the land
itself. History rather than managerial rationality has determined
public land holdings. They are, for the most part, leftovers from
past land disposal programs or lands that were unloaded on the
federal government during the Depression because of local tax
problems. Consequently, many public lands are so geographically
scattered and so varied in quality that rational management techniques are difficult or costly to apply.
This heterogeneity would not be serious were we willing to regard the public domain as a dump for land no one else wanted,
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with the land managing agencies performing the role of caretaker.
This view has been explicitly rejected for many public lands, such as
the national forests and the Taylor Grazing Districts. It has been
implicitly rejected for much of the rest. Despite political sniping,
it sems unlikely that the federal government will be ejected from
the land managing business.8 Moreover, Government lands are
expected to make some economic contribution. This situation, however, creates a dilemma.
The federal government as landlord is responsible for considerable land in small, scattered tracts where extensive managerial attention is too costly to be justified economically. Additionally, the only
contribution of much of the public domain appears to be to hold the
world together. From a benefit-cost standpoint, managerial resources should not be devoted to such tracts that lack economic potential, but should be concentrated on large, compact, and managerially rewarding areas. Nevertheless, the federal government, as
owner, is under pressure to "do something" with all the land it
owns.
The resolution of this dilemma would appear to be to dispose of
scattered parcels that can be turned over to states, local governments, or private persons. Much other land should be designated
for minimal attention and given only the care needed to prevent
fire and similar hazards to health and welfare. Managerial attention
could then be concentrated on the rest of the land-land where the
game justifies the candle.
This remedy, however, is easier to prescribe than to accept. It
requires making explicit what heretofore has been largely implicitthat the federal government is a land entrepreneur. It also requires
making an explicit judgment that much land is best left alone; and
this violates many primeval feelings about the need to utilize and
'"conserve" every bit of American soil.
Also, such a policy would require a process of rationalization of
the public lands including both acquisition and disposal. Congressional approval and funding for such a program might be
difficult to obtain. Even more important and difficult, such a program would probably require rationalization of land-holdings within the federal government; that is, inter-agency transfers. In addition, making explicit the economic responsibilities of the landmanagement agencies would undoubtedly lead to intra-governmental
disputes about which agency should have management authority.
8. Udall, The West and Its Public Lands: Aid or Obstacle to Progress, 4 Natural
Resources J. 1 (1964).
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There are no battles like intramural fights, and the natural resource
agencies are experts in intramural feuds. Thus, we arrive at what
is probably the most serious complication of resource policy, the
division of governmental responsibility.
Divided GovernmentalResponsibility
The organization of natural resource policy and management will
be discussed at greater length later. It is useful at this point, however, to consider some of the ways that the conflicts and divisions
among responsible agencies complicate land management.
The disarranged division or resource responsibility has been criticized by many, including the Hoover Commission. 9 The resulting
administrative inefficiencies and bureaucratic bickerings are well
known. More significant, but less apparent, are the unresolvable
conflicts among agency goals and the larger objectives of resource
management. The result is that implementation of desirable policies
are hampered and "suboptimization" of our resources is the best
that can be achieved. Usually this "suboptimization" is at a very low
level, at best, at the bureau level.
One difficulty is that the division of responsibility often creates
situations where officials lack incentives or authority to deal with the
spill-overs inherent in their decisions. The need to coordinate actions
and insure that decisions are optimal at a level above that of the
individual bureaus has been long recognized. Nevertheless, past
efforts to coordinate and insure a broad enough view so spill-overs
are considered have been spectacularly unsuccessful. This is doubly
unfortunate since the problem of considering the interrelationships
among individual decisions about natural resources is increasing in
importance.
The usual approach to coordination of policy and managerial
decisions has been to form an interagency committee on the basis of
a common input-resource, or a common water-shed or some similar
criterion. Significantly, although the problems that lead to the creation of such committees arise from conflicts among the goals and
programs of the various agencies, the committee members have
never had authority to change the fundamental missions or programs of their agencies.' ° Therefore, instead of coordinating deD.

9. Organization and Policy in the Field of Natural Resources, app. L, prepared
for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(1949) ; Mister Z, The Case for a Department of Natural Resources, 1 Natural Resources J. 197 (1961).
10. Wengert, Natural Resources and the Political Struggle 50-51 (1955).
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cisions, the committees either have been ineffective or have been
merely forums for exchange of information.
Recently, a new approach at coordination has been initiated. President Johnson has instructed the civilian departments to introduce
the program budgeting and planning techniques used in the Department of Defense." A frequent observation has been that many problems in the natural resource area are similar to the defense coordination problems that were partially solved by the McNamara management reforms. It is important, however, to recognize a vital difference. Program budgeting and planning for defense was carried out
within a single Department headed by a strong Secretary who controlled his budget. Program budgeting in natural resources involves
a number of departments and agencies with no single responsible
authority. Unless the President is willing to act as his own Secretary
of Natural Resources, it is doubtful that the results can resemble
those in the defense area. Considering the responsibilities of the
President and the demands on his time, it is neither likely nor
desirable that he have this coordinating responsibility. 2
In short, although economic and technical factors complicate
resource policy, the most serious constraint on obtaining policy and
managerial improvements is the organization of the federal government's natural resource functions. This problem would be sufficiently
severe if it were merely a question of divided responsibility and
inter-agency competition for power. The difficulty, however, is more
basic. There is a fundamental difference in the strategic goals perceived by responsible organizations. There is no consensus about
the appropriate objectives and strategies for public policy toward
natural resources. This is such a fundemantal and important consideration that no discussion of natural resources is complete without an analysis of alternative strategic objectives.
II
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Among governmental agencies with natural resource responsibil11. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Bull. No. 66-3 (October 12, 1965). See also President Johnson's News Conference on August 25, 1965, N.Y. Times, August 26, 1965, p.
14, col. 1; Relevant portions of this news conference are quoted in the forward to
Novick, Program Budgeting, pp. v-vi (1965).
12. The legislative situation is also quite different. Despite Secretary McNamara's
congressional problems, the Defense Department stands on much different grounds on
Capitol Hill than does the current Secretary of the Interior or any future Secretary of
Natural Resources. Individual resource agencies have long standing ties to congressional committees and many legislators consider themselves the ultimate authorities
on resource questions.
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ities, and within the conservation movement
different policy goals can be distinguished.
different strategy for resource management.
gregated into four groups; they will be called
ment, prevention of "exploitation," and the
3
cy.'

at large, a variety of
Each goal implies a
The goals can be agpreservation, developattainment of efficien-

J.

Preservation
The preservation goal implies a strategy that would seek to
minimize the impact of society on the ecological, geological, and
other natural characteristics of land resources. Ethical and aesthetic
considerations are strongly emphasized. Thus, the disappearance of
a species of bird or animal due to habitat changes is held to be
morally wrong by some supporters of this position.' 4
Some of the economic problems stressed by advocates of protection have already been discussed; these are the utility of the
availability of facilities for future use, noncompatible land uses, and
the impact of output decisions on the qualitative characteristics of
the goods and services derived from natural resources. The preservationist school of thought, however, goes far beyond these economic problems and argues for a basic change in the mores and
tastes of society. This is the heart of the problem of preservation
as a resource goal. Present social mores and tastes place a high
value on the consumption of physical goods and services. When one
also considers increases in population, many ecological and similar
changes are inevitable. Consequently, the policy problem is not the
acceptance or rejection of preservation as an objective, but how the
implied strategy can be integrated in some mixed strategy for resource management.
B.

Development
Analysis of development as a strategic goal is difficult because
there is a diversity of emphasis among supporters. Sometimes an
argument similar to the "infant industry" theory of tariffs is advanced. It is asserted that if the Government owns and develops
resources not presently commercially profitable to utilize, regional or
national growth will later justify the investment.
13. Cf. Caufield, Welfare, Economics, and Resources Development, in Land and
Water: Planning for Economic Growth 171-76 (Amoss & McNickle, eds., Western
Resources Conference Papers 1961) ; Hall, Conservation as a Policy Goal, 51 Yale
L.J. 400 (1962).
14. The Perspective of Time, 17 Bull. Atomic Scientists 322 (1961) ; Leopold, The
Conservation Attitude, 35 Natl Parks Magazine 2 (1960).
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Other supporters seem seem to regard intensive utilization of
natural resources as desirable per se. They appear to assume that
natural resources are the only scarce factor of production and should
be developed and used as intensively as technology permits.
Still other supporters appear to regard natural resource development as a form of regional assistance for the West. The argument
usually takes the form that in a pluralistic society regional growth is
an appropriate political objective which justifies national support
of Western resource development. Other views appear to base the
development objective on national growth rather than regional
growth. 15
The one common element in this diversity is a faith in the power
of resource development to trigger a process of economic expansion
-perhaps regionally, perhaps nationally. This faith is subject to
challenge. It is true that economic growth is, in a large measure, the
process of creating and exploiting spill-over benefits from investment or management decisions. It is also possible to cite cases where
natural resource development eliminated growth-limiting bottlenecks or otherwise led to higher rates of national or regional
growth. Nevertheless, economic growth depends upon much more
than the availability of natural resources. Favorable access to markets and available labor force are among the most important necessary conditions and these are usually more significant than resource
endowment. Also, trends in consumption and transportation costs
are lessening the growth impacts of natural resource decisions.
The role of natural resource development in economic growth is
an interesting theoretical question, but it may be irrelevant for
understanding the strategic implications of the development school
of thought. Supporters of the development objective seem less interested in the growth generating process itself and more interested
in how growth is financed.
15. The section of development as a strategic goal assumes substantial "secondary
benefits" from resource development. This is a murky subject, in part, because supporters of the development strategy have seldom developed their portion in rigorous
detail. Instead, arguments for this strategy are most often found in speeches, testimony,
and supporting documents for specific projects. The development goal is, however,
reflected in the treatment of secondary benefits in the cost-benefit analysis for water
resource projects. Julius Margolis analyzes this subject in Secondary Benefits, External
Economics and the Justification of Public Investment, 39 Review of Economics &
Statistics 284 (1957). An areal preference function involving the East versus the West
is also considered. Id. at 290-91. Cf. Hirshleifer, DeHaven & Milliman, Water Supply:
Economics, Technology and Policy 114-51 (1960). See also the speech by Rep. Wayne
Aspinall reported in He Set the "Wise Use" Record Straight, American Forests, July
1962, pp. 9, 46-48.
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Public ownership of resources and public promotion of development is advocated by supporters of the development goal largely,
it appears, because of the financial possibilities inherent in Government financing. At the simplest level, because the Government can
tax and borrow money at lower cost than private investors, local
groups can obtain less expensive financing of investments than possible in private financial markets. Also, there is always the possibility that some of the cost of obtaining local benefits may be shifted
to the Nation as a whole. At a more sophisticated level, governmental financial arrangements permit a set of prices for outputs
from multiple purpose projects such that the sale of certain commodities or services can be used to subsidize other outputs. The
classic example here is multiple purpose river developments where
produced
power sales frequently finance irrigation. The anomalies
16
by such arrangements will be familiar to all readers.
Development as a policy goal, then, can be thought of as concerned with externalities inherent in the growth process and increasing growth rates (local or national) through increased utilization of
natural resources. To this view, however, must always be added the
consideration that the strategy that supporters of this view advocate, governmental ownership and investment, is not derived from
the technical features of the growth process. Rather it is the favorable financial opportunities sometimes available for local developments by the federal government that are the prime element.
Prevention of Exploitation
The third strategic goal that should be mentioned is the prevention of "exploitation." The older literature on natural resources,
stemming from the progressive movement, advocated a natural
resources policy directed at preventing "monopolists" and other
''rapacious entrepreneurs" from using the national heritage for
private gain.17 The strategy advocated was Government ownership
and management. The implicit assumption was that public officials
would have the knowledge and disinterested motives required to
achieve "best" use. This view is directly related to the philosophy
that led to the creation of state and federal regulatory commissions
for many industries. In both the natural resources area and industry
C.

16. An interesting example is analyzed in Carlin & Hoehn, Is the Marble Canyon
Project Economically Justified? (The RAND Corporation, Paper No. 3303, Feb. 1966).
17. The classic statements are contained in the works of Gifford Pinchot. See also
McConnell, The Conservation Movement-Past and Present, 7 Western Political Q.
463 (1954); a useful collection of articles on this and other goals is contained in
Amoss & McNickle, op. cit. supra note 13.
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regulation, we have come to see that Government ownership or
control does not automatically create expertise, eliminate conflicts of
interest, or achieve economic optimality.
Few today view the natural resources problem as one of keeping
bad businessmen out and good government in; nevertheless, this
school of thought merits mention for two reasons. The first is that it
has had much indirect influence on our thinking. In our approach to
natural resource problems we are all strongly conditioned by Gifford
Pinchot, W.J. McGee, T.R. Roosevelt, and others. This background tends to make us less inclined than we should be to consider
the appropriate relative roles of the Government and private
sectors.
There is a second reason for considering this school of thought.
While the problems of monopoly and other conditions of market
failure stressed by this group are relevant for natural resource
policy, the history of the early conservation movement shows us that
the important problem is not public versus private ownership but of
organization. Only if a government organization that vests responsible authorities with the proper incentives and span of control can
be devised will problems of obtaining "best use" be achieved.
Achievement to date on this score has not been encouraging.
Attainment of Efficiency
The final goal to be discussed here has been given the title of
"attainment of efficiency," for want of a better term. Supporters of
this goal view resource management as merely one of the many
public policies designed to achieve the optimal menu and amount of
goods and services from the economic system. The strategic implicawhenever spill-overs
tion is that the Government should intervene
8
or other conditions lead to market failure.'
This position differs from the others. Current tastes and costs are
taken as appropriate for social calculations. The preservationist
strategy, by contrast, asserts the additional relevance of aesthetic
and moral considerations; indeed, at times the argument seems to
be that only aesthetic and moral considerations are relevant. The
development strategy rejects market costs-particularly the interest
rate-as relevant for investment calculations. By contrast, the
efficiency school views the objective of public policy to be that of
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18. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis (1958) ; Krutilla & Eckstein, op. cit. supra note 1; Scott, Natural Resources: The Economics of
Conservation (1955) ; Mason, The Political Economy of Resource Use, in Perspectives on Conservation 157-86 (Jarrett,ed. 1958).
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substituting optional managerial rules for imperfect markets in
order to achieve perfect market results. The other schools go
further and would substitute for this economic optimality another
set of output and price results.
The question of strategic objectives merits more discussion than
can be provided here. Present interest is in three points brought out
by this summary. The first is that although all groups are concerned
with spill-overs and other causes of market-failure, there are significant differences among the goals. The second point is that neither
preservation, nor development, nor efficiency can be regarded as a
dominant goal. Efficiency as a goal accords best with the general
governmental economic policy; yet regional, growth, and aesthetic
considerations are valid aspects of public policy. Certainly, there is
strong political support for each and it is obvious that Government
policy in the future will be a mixed strategy that will try to achieve
all three goals to some degree. The difficult question is what this
mixture will or should be.
Leaving this question aside, let us turn to the third point. The
existence of multiple goals for resource policy explains a phenomenon so hard to clarify for those unfamiliar with the history of the
conservation movement. This question is why there is conflict over
management and development decisions among people who all profess to be conservationists. Even more confusing to many people are
conflicts among bureaus within the Government or even within the
Department of the Interior. One is frequently asked why the Bureau
of Reclamation would seek to develop an area the Park Service
wishes to remain undeveloped, or why there are inter-agency conflicts over a wilderness system. The explanation for these and similar conundrums is the lack of a single objective for natural resource
policy. Since our strategy seeks multiple objectives, it is easy to find
people who accept the strategy but weigh the goals differently from
others who also accept the strategy.
This lack of consensus about the goals of resource policy would
be serious enough, but there is an additional complicating factor.
The present organization of the federal government makes an
objective, rational, social decision about a mixed resource strategy
most difficult to obtain.
III
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Selection of the appropriate strategy for natural resource policy
(as well as dealing with the complicating factors discussed in section
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I) would be much improved by two major changes. The first is
intellectual; we need an end-use approach to policy formation. The
second change is institutional; we need a major reorganization of
the federal government's resource responsibility. The two changes
are interrelated. Both are aspects of the single problems of attempting to coordinate and harmonize the diverse and diffused federal
activity in the natural resource sector.
The search for an organizing principle was mentioned earlier.
The most recent attempt to bring order out of chaos is program
planning and budgeting. Despite the reservations expressed earlier
about this system, it does represent an important advance over
previous coordination attempts. Program budgeting relates planning
to the end-uses of resources rather than attempting to establish
policy on the basis of specific-input resources. Begin with the enduses expected from our natural resources and the public programs
affecting them. Then work backward to the specific-inputs. This
procedure makes it easier to perceive complementaries and conflicts
among strategic goals, as well as possible trade-offs among input
resources that could increase performance.
In part, the advantage of viewing natural resource policy and
programs in terms of end-uses is psychological. Resource programs
can be analyzed from the viewpoint of outputs, or functional activities, or inputs. Since analysis will require cross-classification, in
theory it does not matter which element is taken as the organizing
principle. One recent and influential study points this out, and
chooses input-resources-that it, forests, land, water, and the likeas the organizing basis since better data are available on an input
basis than on outputs or functions. 9 Yet, there are better data on
inputs only because inputs are the customary basis of governmental
organization. This custom, moreover, is the source of much of the
difficulty with natural resource policy and management.
When administrative responsibility is assigned on the basis of
specific-resource inputs, it becomes easy to slip into the practice of
judging the success of a bureau by the intensity with which its resource is utilized. It becomes hard to find anyone interested in asking
the question of whether trade-offs among input-resources might
better meet our resource goals. To illustrate, who has the responsibility or interest to ask whether the beef now produced on grazing
districts might better be grown in the national forests or in Iowa
feeder lots?
19. Hirsch, Program Budget for Natural Resources Activities, in Program Budgeting 257-58 (Novick ed. 1965).
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A more subtle aspect of this problem is that an input-based
organization leads professions to become identified with inputs in a
way that is not always conducive to good policy. Foresters, for
example, take pride in being called "timber-beasts" and tend to
identify their profession with the production of wood for harvesting. The result is a tendency to maximize the amount of wood rather
than the economic value of the wood grown in the national forests.20
This is a natural result since all professions admire "best practice"
and an input-based organization provides many opportunities to
apply "best practice" for its own sake. Another result is that foresters interested in recreation use of forests may find themselves called
"birdy-watchers" or similar disapprobative terms by their fellows.
The result is that some professions seem implicitly to view their task
as the protection of a resource from society rather than to be
stewards of the resources for the sake of society.
A functional approach to resource program coordination-that
is, separating research, development, management, regulation, and
the like-has appeal. In the past, resource policy has too often been
equated with management and development, to the neglect of other
ways of achieving resource objectives. The most serious neglect,
probably, has been of research. The oft-predicted exhaustion of our
natural resources has thus far been averted primarily by scientific
discoveries. Despite this, there has been a remarkable lack of
coordination of research with other functional activities. It is salutary to ask why research in the natural resources area has not played
the role it has played in agriculture.
Again the answer appears to lie in governmental organization.
Public-resource-research agencies seem to have fallen into two different traps. Some have become self-contained units oriented to
the professional counterparts outside the Government. The result is
that much outstanding "pure" research never becomes translated
into policy or management practice. A second and opposite tendency
is for research organizations to become the handmaidens of managerial personnel. Here the problem is "practicality." Research becomes directed to helping managers do their present jobs better
rather than trying to provide new alternatives for dealing with basic
resource problems.
20. Gaffney, Concepts of Financial Maturity of Timber (North Carolina State
Agricultural Economics Information Series No. 62, 1960). For a statement of how one
influential forester and former president of the Society of American Forests views
the role of his profession and the issues he would place beyond the scope of quantitative analysis, see Connaughton, The Forester's Philosophy of Land Use, American
Forests, January 1962, pp. 9, 62.
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Since the current trend is for new research activities and larger
expenditures for on-going research programs, the problem of integration into our strategies is increasing in importance. The same

proposition applies to regulation. Regulation of private activities
can often substitute for direct governmental activities and frequently has advantages. These potential advantages are too often overlooked-in part, because natural resource agencies so often view
their responsibilities in terms of inputs rather than functions or
outputs.
The conclusion is that while it is desirable that more attention
be given to trade-offs among functions, a functional organization of
resource activities is not appropriate. The problem is to integrate
functions rather than to separate them.
An end-use approach to natural resources is the only one likely
to provide the best prospect for making the trade-offs between
strategic objectives and input resources that are the essence of
resource policy-making. Without an end-use approach it is easy to
forget that the natural resources are for people and not the other
way around. Nevertheless, an end-use approach has a number of
implementational difficulties.
One of these difficulties is conceptional. In the natural resources
area it is not always easy to separate inputs and outputs. Is an
output of a national forest the availability of trees or timber cut
for lumber, pulp, and the like? The two definitions of output imply
different silvicultural and harvesting provisions, so the answer is
important. A true end-use approach would define the output in
terms of the products that enter the production of consumption
goods-that is, timber, pulp, and the like. Nevertheless, many who
espouse an end-use approach take the other view. 21 This is merely
one illustration of the inherent and general definitional problem
with the end-use approach.
The most serious problem with implementing an end-use approach, however, is the revision that will be required in the structure
of public administration. It is one thing to know what should be
21. In this regard it is significant that Hirsch in the influential work already
cited defines as products, eight major programs: land (mainly agricultural) resources,
water resources, forest resources, recreational resources, and four other "resources."
These are regarded as "intermediate products and/or end products." A number of
these programs, however, produce the same end products-examples are grazing and
recreation. Hirsch, however, appears primarily concerned about the availability of an
adequate resource base, thus his end products are really intermediate products. A few
moments reflection will reveal, however, the difference in policy implications of an
approach that focuses on intermediate rather than end products.
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done but an entirely different thing to be able to do it. Ability
rather than desire, in the present natural resource situation, is an
issue of organization.
At present, the federal organization is inconsistent with an enduse approach in two respects. The first is that each agency has
certain resources or areas assigned to it. This means that each
agency is going to have to become a broad-multiple-purpose organization (which implies only small differences among agencies) or
else there is going to have to be much greater ability to transfer and
shift resources among agencies than now exists. Ideally, public land,
for example, might be held in a common pool and assigned to
various agencies; or a consortium of agency personnel might be
assigned to the land area as dictated by the strategic and operational
decisions about the appropriate amount and mix of end-uses.
In the absence of such arrangements, decisions that had the same
effect might be made by some authority above the agency level.
Here, however, the second inconsistency of the present organization
is encountered. This is the lack of any authority with the ability to
make the appropriate trade-offs. The nominal authorizations of
present departmental level officials are usually just that-nominal.
When this nominal authorization is divided among several departments, the best that can be expected is sub-optimization on an
agency-by-agency basis. The results, naturally, are neglect of spillovers, definition of goals in terms of input-use intensity rather than
end-use outputs, and lack of desire or ability to make the resource
trade-offs necessary to achieve our resource goals.
Ideally, there should be a Department of Natural Resources
where the Secretary has authority to make decisions for the entire
resource area. Even more desirable would be reorganization at the
agency or bureau level. Specification of an ideal reorganization,
however, goes far beyond the scope of this Article. The relevant
point is: while there are many improvements that can and should
be made in the present circumstances, significant changes in resource
policy require basic changes in governmental organization. Stating
this proposition the other way around, the present organization
severely constrains natural resource policy improvements. Changing
these constraints is both the most fundemental and the most productive contribution that could be made in the natural resource sector.
CONCLUSION

Recent years have seen many improvements in our knowledge
about natural resource problems and the managerial tools available
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to resource managers. Perhaps more important is the recent interest,
of which the existence of a Public Land Law Review Commission is
an example, in increasing and improving federal efforts in the natural
resources area. Many opportunities exist for advances within the
present structure. This Article, however, has neglected these opportunities in order to emphasize the interconnections between fundamental policy changes and organizational considerations. Most of
us concerned with natural resources prefer to keep these two subjects separate. Certainly, study of relationships between policy and
public administration is both difficult and often a source of despair.
Nevertheless, such study is a vital necessity. More and more our
ability to improve natural resource policy and management will depend upon our ability to create a governmental framework with
the desire and ability to implement policy changes.

